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Abstract♦ 
To increase the amount of logic available to the users 
in SRAM-based FPGAs, manufacturers are using 
nanometric technologies to boost logic density and 
reduce costs, making its use more attractive. However, 
these technological improvements also make FPGAs 
particularly vulnerable to configuration memory bit-flips 
caused by power fluctuations, strong electromagnetic 
fields and radiation. This issue is particularly sensitive 
because of the increasing amount of configuration 
memory cells needed to define their functionality. 
A short survey of the most recent publications is 
presented to support the options assumed during the 
definition of a framework for implementing circuits 
immune to bit-flips induction mechanisms in memory 
cells, based on a customized redundant infrastructure 
and on a detection-and-fix controller. 
 
1. Introduction 
The introduction of Very Large Scale Integration 
(VLSI) technologies increased substantially the 
reliability of electronic systems, when compared with the 
previous use of discrete components. Hence, the use of 
fault tolerance techniques was confined only to specific 
applications requiring high levels of reliability or 
operating on harsh environments. Shrinking 
transistors’ size leads to a greater integration and to a per 
unit power reduction, enabling chips to grow both in size 
and complexity. But new nanometer scales also brought 
negative aspects, such as a high probability of 
occurrence of memory bit-flips, caused by power 
fluctuations, electromagnetic interferences or radiation. 
This issue has a particular impact on the reliability of 
SRAM-based Field Programmable Gate Arrays 
(FPGAs). The exponential growth in the number of 
                                                          
♦ This work is supported by an FCT program under contract 
POSC/EEA-ESE/55680/2004 
memory cells needed for configuration purposes makes 
them especially vulnerable to memory bit-flips, resulting 
on Single Event Upsets (SEU) and Multi-Bit Upsets 
(MBU) [1-7]. Despite faults due to memory bit-flips do 
not physically damage the chip, their effects are 
permanent, since the functionality of the circuits mapped 
into the device is permanently altered.  
Although anti-fuse technology-based FPGAs are less 
prone to SEUs due to the absence of configuration 
memory cells, SRAM-based FPGAs have been the 
preferred choice, for instance, in space missions, like 
MARS 2003 Lander and Rover vehicles, where they 
were exposed to extremely harsh conditions. That’s 
because their processing performance is 10 to 100 times 
higher than the performance attained by anti-fuse 
technology-based FPGAs, and also due to their 
reconfigurable features, which enable resource 
multiplexing, updating of algorithms during long space 
missions, avoiding mission obsolescence, and correction 
of design flaws in orbit [8]. 
In non-reconfigurable technologies, such as ASICs, 
protection against SEUs is restricted to flip-flops, 
because logic paths between them are typically hard-
-wired. Notwithstanding, Single Event Transients 
(SETs), a charge transient induced in a wire by the 
incidence of an heavy ion, may be propagated to flip-
-flop inputs, where they have a high probability to be 
registered causing soft-errors in the user data. Besides, if 
it strikes a clock line, double-clocking may occur leading 
to an extemporaneous update that may affect, depending 
on the charge value and on line attenuation, part of or all 
the flip-flops driven by that line. Further protection is 
only achieved through full module redundancy. This is 
also a preferred choice to improve the reliability of 
highly critical real-time applications based on FPGAs 
[4, 8-10]. Due to their inherent configurability, FPGAs 
are especially suitable for the implementation of modular 
redundancy, since it does not require any new 
architectural feature and it is function independent. 
However, their dependency on memory cells to define 
logic paths makes these also susceptible to SEUs. Again, 
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in this case, the only effective protection is full module 
redundancy [9]. 
In a discrete implementation of a Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR) system, if a defect affects the 
functionality of one module, the reliability index of the 
system decreases, but the system still works correctly. In 
this method, extra components are used to 
instantaneously mask the effect of a faulty component, 
meaning that no propagation of the fault will occur. 
However, a second failure in one of the remaining 
modules may lead to a system failure. Ideally, when a 
module fails, it should be replaced to restore the initial 
system redundancy index, but this action may not be 
possible immediately. In certain cases, like in space 
applications, it may even be impossible. With FPGAs 
this drawback may be overcome without a significant 
rise in costs, because, in the event of a module failure, 
the initial system redundancy index may be restored just 
by performing a reconfiguration of the affected module. 
No physical replacement is therefore necessary. 
The aim of this paper is to define a set of rules for a 
new framework for implementing highly critical real-
-time integrated systems based on dynamically 
reconfigurable FPGAs. The aim is to make these systems 
immune to faults emerging from memory bit-flips, by 
confining, detecting, locating and mitigating them. The 
proposed framework is built around a customised Triple 
Modular Redundancy implementation associated to a 
fault detection-and-fix controller. This controller is 
responsible for: 
(i) detecting data incoherencies; 
(ii) locating the faulty redundant module; and 
(iii) restoring the original module configuration, 
fixing it without affecting the normal operation of the 
functional logic. 
This mechanism was implemented in a XC2V1500, 
part of the Virtex-II FPGA family from Xilinx. This 
approach enables the confinement and detection of faulty 
modules, and the determination of when reconfiguration 
must be applied to restore proper system operation 
before cumulative errors, induced over time, leads to its 
failure. A short survey of the most recent data published 
concerning the impact of radiation induced faults on 
FPGAs and on FPGA based TMR implementations is 
reviewed to support the options assumed during the 
implementation phase. A discussion on the issues that 
come up during this phase, mainly concerning design 
options and architectural features of the FPGA, which 
may prevent an efficient implementation of the proposed 
framework, are presented. This work is part of a broader 
project, aiming the design of FPGA-based self repairing 
circuits. Several aspects related to its practical 
implementation are also pointed out, and current and 
future research lines are presented in the concluding 
section. 
2. Background 
The results of several radiation campaigns performed 
to understand the effects radiation induced faults have on 
the behavior of circuits implemented in SRAM-based 
FPGAs were reported in the literature by several authors 
[2, 3, 10]. These authors observed that, in general, 
radiation leads to changes on the correct functionality of 
the circuits, an effect defined as a Single Event 
Functional Interrupt (SEFI). A classification of SEFIs 
according to the affected resources and their effects was 
proposed in [1-2]. 
Several fault injection approaches, alternative to the 
always expensive radiation campaigns, may also be 
found in literature. A comparatively cheaper alternative 
is the use of electromagnetic interferences to conduct 
contactless fault injection. These are common 
disturbances in automotive vehicles, trains, airplanes, or 
industrial plants. Such a technique is widely used to 
stress digital equipment. Thanks to the use of 
commercial burst generators, this technique is easy to 
implement [7]. 
A different approach is the use of emulation 
techniques. Bit-flips are injected by direct manipulation 
of the configuration memory bitstream of the FPGA, 
either through changes in the original configuration 
bitstream or at run-time through dynamic reconfiguration 
[11, 12]. The greatest advantage of emulation methods is 
the higher controllability of the experiments, in contrast 
to the unpredictability of radiation or electromagnetic 
interference fault injection, which enables a better 
diagnostic of the effects of each SEU. A combination of 
both techniques, not only to increase the controllability 
of the experiments, but also to verify the accuracy of the 
emulation fault injection techniques used, may be found 
in [4, 7, 8, 13, 14]. 
Lately, several hardening techniques have been 
proposed to avoid SEU effects on the functional 
behavior of circuits. Correcting techniques based on 
dynamic reconfiguration, known as scrubbing, like those 
presented on [15-17], periodically read back the 
configuration memory to detect bit-flips caused by 
SEUs. If a bit-flip is detected the affected frame is 
reconfigured and the system reset thereafter. However, 
the same authors recognized some limitations to these 
techniques: a fault-free read back of the configuration 
bitstream does not always guarantee that a SEU did not 
occur. As an example, SEUs or SETs affecting flip-flop 
states occur without upsetting the bitstream but may 
severely disturb or halt function operation. Another 
drawback is fault detection latency. Reading back the 
whole configuration memory may take several to 
hundred of milliseconds, depending on the FPGA size 
and on the interface used to perform the read back 
operation. By then, the fault may already have caused 
the irreversible malfunctioning of the whole system, 
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eventually interrupting its operation. In some cases, it 
may even be impossible to recover from this situation. 
Alternative techniques based on hardware redundancy 
were proposed without the aim of identifying and 
correcting the fault but just to mask its existence. 
Through TMR extensive testing, several authors have 
shown that SEU induced failures can be properly 
controlled for the Virtex family of FPGA devices 
[9, 10, 14, 18]. Fault tolerance is achieved using extra 
components to instantaneously mask the effect of a 
faulty component, meaning that no fault propagation will 
occur. Still, as no fault detection occurs, the faulty 
module is not replaced and therefore initial redundancy 
(and reliability) is not restored. Consequently, over time, 
cumulative faults will inevitably lead to a system failure. 
The consideration of the results reached during 
radiation campaigns concerning MBUs due to single 
charged particles is also important, since they may 
potentially affect multiple redundant modules and 
produce incorrect values. The effects produced by MBUs 
are intrinsically related to the architecture of the 
configuration memory. In Virtex families, configuration 
memory is divided into one bit wide vertical frames that 
span from the top to the bottom of the array. Each 
column of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) comprises 
multiple frames, which combine internal CLB 
configuration and state information with column routing 
and interconnection information. In [8] it is reported that, 
in the case of the Virtex family, MBUs occurred all in 
the same configuration frame while in the Virtex-II 
family the percentage of MBUs that occurred in the 
same configuration frame decreases to 88%. However, 
no MBUs spanned the configuration data of separated 
resource columns [4]. No correlation was observed 
between MBUs and module granularity sizes, which 
indicates that even at very fine granularities if the 
modules are placed far enough to not share routing 
networks, TMR is still a good option. These results also 
reveal some important information about the placement 
of the configurable memory cells inside the FPGA. This 
information is important to understand the fault 
induction mechanism due to radiation and 
electromagnetic interferences. 
In sum, the association between dynamic 
reconfiguration and TMR seems thus far to be the most 
effective way to mitigate the effects of radiation and 
electromagnetic interferences, albeit some care must be 
taken during the mapping of the circuits into the FPGA. 
The above reviewed experimental results and 
conclusions were taken into account when creating the 
framework for the design and implementation of 
radiation immune FPGA-based real-time systems that is 
proposed in this paper. 
3. Framework bases 
At this point, it is logical to infer, based on the 
previous analysis, that to protect the operation of an 
FPGA-based systems against radiation and 
electromagnetic interferences it has to be implemented 
using TMR. Moreover, it has to incorporate an 
autonomous mitigation mechanism to avoid system 
failures due to the cumulative effects of SEUs. 
In a classic TMR implementation [19], the correct 
system output values are settled by voting elements that 
accept the outputs from three redundant sources and 
deliver the majority vote at their outputs. Each redundant 
source may be a simple gate or a more complex unit, like 
a microprocessor. The voting element accepts the 
outputs from the three sources and delivers the majority 
vote at its output. This concept can be extended to any 
number of redundant modules to produce an N-modular 
redundant (NMR) system, which can tolerate up to n 
module failures, where n=floor[(N-1)/2]. 
The reliability equation for an NMR system is given 
by [19]: 
 
 
 
This assumes that the majority voter does not fail, 
which is an unrealistic principle. When this assumption 
is not verified, the reliability of the voter element will 
determine the reliability of the circuit, since it will fail if 
the voter fails, regardless of whether or not other 
modules fail. The reliability of a voter in a redundant 
system can be improved by replicating this element as 
well, in a scheme that is called T-TMR. For its proper 
nature, T-TMR implementations mask any single fault 
emerging during circuit operation. Multiple faults may 
also be masked providing that they affect only one of the 
redundant modules or voters, or, if upsetting different 
modules, they affect different signals and that bitwise 
comparison is used. In these cases, faults are confined to 
the module or voter where they emerged, not becoming 
visible outside.  
To fully prevent functional problems caused by 
configuration upsets, each signal should enter the FPGA 
in triplicate, using three input pins. Otherwise, if a single 
input was connected to all three redundant modules, then 
a failure at the single input would cause the error to 
propagate through all the redundant modules, and thus 
the error would not be masked. 
This same principle applies to clock signals. Each of 
the triplicate circuit modules should receive its own 
clock. Otherwise, spurious signals induced by SETs on a 
single clock line may lead to an extemporaneous update 
of all the three-module registers and to the asynchronous 
output of possibly incorrect values. 
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Output signals should also leave the FPGA in 
triplicate, with minority voters monitoring each one of 
the outputs. The three signals converge to a same node 
outside. When one of the outputs is different from the 
others, the correspondent pin is driven to high 
impedance. Figure 1 illustrates this scheme. 
 
Figure 1. Full TMR output scheme 
implementation. 
To avoid the effect of MBUs on the different modules 
[4], the three redundant functional modules should be 
placed in different columns of the FPGA. Therefore, the 
FPGA should be divided in four vertical areas: three for 
the functional circuit modules and a fourth for the 
placement of the detection-and-fix controller. To avoid 
possible route networking shares, 
module’ interconnections to inputs and outputs should 
not cross different implementation areas. The overall 
implementation scheme is presented in figure 2, where 
‘M’ stands for “Majority voters” while ‘m’ stands for 
“minority voters”. 
When one or more faults appear in one of the 
modules or voters, the T-TMR implementation confines 
the fault and masks its existence, avoiding its 
propagation to the rest of the circuit. However, the 
cumulative effects of several faults induced over time 
may suppress the effectiveness of the confinement and 
masking mechanism, resulting in fault propagation. With 
the aim of detecting the emergence of faults a detection-
-and-fix controller is implemented in the fourth area 
defined on the FPGA logic space. A detailed overview of 
the detection-and-fix controller structure is shown in 
figure 3. This controller is responsible for detecting data 
incoherencies, locating the faulty module and restoring 
the original configuration. This is done transparently, 
through partial reconfiguration of the affected functional 
module, without human intervention, since physical 
component replacement is not needed. As a result, a 
higher level of maintainability is achieved without 
implying the inoperability of the circuit. 
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Figure 2. Proposed framework overview. 
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Figure 3. Overview of the detection-and-fix 
controller structure. 
4. Fault Detection, Location and Mitigation 
This last point implies not only the existence of 
redundancy but also of a mechanism able to detect the 
emergence of an induced fault. It is very hard to detect a 
fault in a T-TMR implementation using traditional 
online test strategies, since the redundancy of the circuit 
masks it instantaneously. In our approach, the detection 
of the faulty modules is done through three scan chains 
that regularly capture the values at the outputs of the 
modules and voters. The use of scan-chains enables the 
134
isolation of the module or faulty voter and the quick 
diagnose of the area where it occurred. 
A Boundary-Scan (BS)-like infrastructure [20] is used 
to implement the scan chain. Since only observability is 
required, a simple version of the BS cell, an observe-
-only input cell, as described in the IEEE 1149.1 
standard [20] and shown in figure 4, was used. 
Therefore, no delay is introduced in the signal’s path by 
the scan chain. To avoid the capture of undefined values, 
scan chain update is synchronous with the system clock, 
assuring that modules or voters outputs will be in a 
steady state when they are captured. The scan chain 
control signals are generated by the detection-and-fix 
controller. This controller regularly triggers the updating 
of the scan chains and the shifting of its contents, 
comparing the values at different outputs. In our 
framework we used three parallel scan chains, each one 
covering a different redundant module. In this way, it is 
easier for the controller to diagnose with accuracy which 
one of the three module areas was affected by the 
occurrence of a fault, and to promote its reconfiguration. 
Moreover, putting more than one scan chain in parallel 
has the additional advantage of decreasing fault 
detection latency. The shifting time will be divided by 
the number of parallel scan chains, enabling more 
frequent captures. 
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Figure 4. Observe-only BS cell. 
The sequence of tasks followed by the detection-and-
-fix controller is represented on the flowchart shown in 
figure 5. This sequence is endlessly repeated in search 
for emerging faults in the controller or user modules. 
The serial bitstreams captured through the scan chains 
are shifted to the internal controller where they are 
compared, bit-by-bit. 
If an incoherency is detected, the module or voter 
where it was produced is probably not working properly. 
Obviously, the controller and the scan chains may also 
be affected by SEUs that may cause their disruption. To 
prevent it, the controller is implemented using T-TMR 
and its modules and voters output signals are also 
covered by the scan chains, creating a self-verifiable 
circuit. The option of concentrating the controller in only 
one area, despite being implemented using T-TMR, was 
taken to not increase unnecessarily its complexity and 
the number of occupied CLB columns. However, since it 
occupies fewer slices than those available in the 
columns, a convenient separation between modules was 
implemented. 
 
Figure 5. Detection-and-fix controller flowchart. 
The first bits of the scan chain belong to the outputs 
of the controller. If an incoherency is detected in those 
first bits, the controller will immediately be full 
reconfigured. This procedure aims to guarantee the good 
working condition of the controller. Despite not being a 
critical component concerning the functionality of the 
system, its good working condition is mandatory to 
avoid accumulation of errors and, as a result, to prevent 
future system failure. 
If an incoherency is detected on one of the outputs of 
one of the modules or voters, the area where it is 
implemented will be reconfigured after the last bit of the 
scan chains has been shifted. If several incoherencies are 
detected in the same module, the module is reconfigured 
after a parameterizable number of errors, even before 
reaching the last bit of the scan chains. A new capture is 
then performed and the verification process restarted.  
Of course, if an upset affects the values shifted 
through the scan chain, this will lead to a wrong fault 
diagnosis and consequently to an extemporaneous 
reconfiguration of one of the modules. However, despite 
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unnecessary, it will not affect the whole system 
operation. 
A more complicated situation happens if the structural 
configuration of the scan chains is affected by a fault. In 
this case, several neighboring bits will be disturbed, 
wrongly suggesting that a general failure in one or more 
modules is taking place. In addition, to exactly locate the 
place where the fault has emerged is not possible. 
Therefore, after the occurrence of a parameterizable 
number of errors, either in the controller or in the 
modules, the controller undertakes the full dynamic 
reconfiguration of the FPGA to completely restore the 
scan chains. 
The exact location of the faulty module or voter 
enables the controller to activate the partial 
reconfiguration and to restore its correct functional 
definition. An external memory keeps the original partial 
configuration files for the four defined areas. Notice that, 
due to the volatility of the SRAM-like FPGA 
configuration memory, this external memory is already 
necessary to hold the FPGA configuration bitstream to 
be uploaded during system power up. 
The inclusion of a fault detection mechanism brings 
several advantages to the performance of the recovery 
procedure. In this case, scrubbing occurs only when its 
need is identified and on a very defined target, which, 
having in mind the intervals between the occurrence of 
SEUs, even in space applications [15], results in 
considerable power savings when compared with 
periodic “blind” full reconfiguration. 
Even SEUs that do not upset the bitstream, like those 
affecting flip-flop states that cannot be removed by 
reconfiguration, will be detected. This means, as 
mentioned before, that scrubbing by itself can not assure 
proper work, and TMR is always needed to avoid fault 
propagation. However, due to the transient nature of 
upsets, the soft error will be recovered by the circuit in 
the subsequent update of the affected flip-flop. 
5. Case study 
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, a 
twenty four-bit counter was implemented, following the 
rules defined in the proposed framework, in a 
XC2V1500-based prototyping board. The detection-and-
fix controller used a total of 254 slices, distributed by 
two of the 40 available CLB columns, representing an 
overhead of 5% in terms of occupied area. Notice that 
this overhead is constant and independent of the size or 
the complexity of the systems implemented on the 
FPGA. The remaining 38 columns were divided in three 
areas of 12 CLB columns each, leaving a total of 2304 
slices available for the implementation of each of the 
modules of the user’s circuit. The remaining two 
columns were placed between module areas. Despite not 
essential to assure a good immunity to column-spanning 
MBUs, these two columns, which result from the 
remainder of the integer division of the remaining 38 
columns by the 3 areas, were placed between them to 
reinforce protection. 
The implementation of a TMR circuit in an FPGA 
may be a hard work, mainly because some design tools 
are not prepared to implement redundant circuits in an 
FPGA. As redundant logic seems, at first sight, 
“redundant”, the first thing synthesis tools do is to 
eliminate it. Redundant modules and the whole voters 
may just disappear from the final implementation. In our 
example, from the initial design, only a simple four-bit 
binary counter module remained in the end of the 
synthesis process. To avoid it, design tools have to be 
instructed to keep hierarchy. In this way, design units 
will be preserved and not merged with the rest of the 
design, and redundancy will be kept. 
Although flip-flops in configurable logic blocks have 
programmable features that are selected by configuration 
latches, flip-flop registers are separated from 
configuration latches and cannot be accessed through 
configuration. Therefore, partial reconfiguration does not 
affect the data stored in these registers, and 
consequently, as mentioned before, soft-errors in data 
registers, even being detected when the scan chain is 
updated, cannot be recovered using this method. During 
design project it should be assured that all flip-flops are 
updated at each clock cycle, thus, due to the transient 
nature of upsets, the soft-error will be recovered by the 
circuit in the subsequent update of the affected flip-flop. 
Therefore, if a SEU affects one flip-flop, the fault it 
generates will be corrected immediately at the next clock 
cycle. The propagation of soft-errors that affect data 
registers is avoided by the proper nature of TMR. 
The assignment of areas to the different modules and 
to the detection-and-fix controller is done through the 
use of placement constraints, attached to the description 
of the system. These constraints are taken into account 
by the place-and-route algorithm, when mapping the 
different modules in the FPGA resources. Manual 
adjustments may need to be performed on the final 
floorplanning, as tools are not prepared to deal automatic 
and efficiently with these constraints. 
Each module area enables the implementation of 
circuits far more complex than the one used to test the 
proposed approach. The incorporation of the scan chain 
implied an overhead of 3 slices per module output, 
necessary to capture the output of the module and the 
outputs of the corresponding majority and minority 
voter. Therefore, this overhead depends on the number 
of outputs of the user system and not of its complexity. 
In case of fault detection, the detection-and-fix controller 
triggers the partial reconfiguration of the affected area, 
by resolving the location address of the file to be 
configured. Our prototyping board uses SystemAce [21] 
from Xilinx to keep trace of the partial configuration 
files and to configure the FPGA. However, different 
kinds of interfaces may be used to provide the partial 
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reconfiguration files, including remote sources. The 
partial configuration files were generated using the 
Foundation tools from Xilinx.  
The dynamic reconfiguration of part or whole of the 
FPGA configuration memory does not affect the normal 
operation of the functions whose functionality is not 
changed, even if these functions are in an active state 
and its placement area is covered by the reconfiguration. 
In sum, the mitigation procedure is completely 
transparent.  
The maximum speed of operation achieved by the 
detection-and-fix controller was 200MHz. Since capture 
operations must be synchronous with user’s system 
operation, any speed below this one may be used. 
Several tests based on localized fault injection 
through partial reconfiguration proved the effectiveness 
of the proposed concept. However, a random fault 
injection procedure is being developed to better simulate 
real working conditions. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presented a framework for the 
confinement, detection and mitigation of induced faults 
in FPGAs, built around a customised TMR 
implementation. Several issues related to the 
effectiveness of TMR to cope with radiation and 
electromagnetic interferences induced faults were 
reviewed and discussed. It was explained, based on a 
compilation of experimental data reported by several 
authors, why T-TMR associated to scrubbing seems to 
be the most effective approach to mitigate induced faults 
in FPGAs and to extend the reliability of the 
implemented systems. Several techniques were listed to 
improve the effectiveness of T-TMR implementations, 
taking into consideration some conclusions extracted 
from the analysis of that data. These considerations led 
to some questions and to the enumeration of a set of 
rules to be followed to get the most from a T-TMR 
implementation in terms of radiation and 
electromagnetic interferences induced fault protection. A 
simple case study based on a practical implementation 
enabled the quantification of the area overhead 
introduced and the assessment of the effectiveness of our 
proposal. Further work is being done to emulate real 
harsh operation conditions to better evaluate the 
behavior of the framework. 
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